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HARRY WELLINGTON, INTELLECTUAL ICONOCLAST AND
SKEPTIC: A TRIBUTE*
RALPH K. WINTER**

I have to begin on a personal note. It has been a terribly nostalgic
occasion for me to remember my beginnings at Yale Law School, reading some of the things that Harry wrote in that era, and reading what
both of us have written later on. I believe that Harry's contracts class
was the first law school class I ever attended. And I am quite sure it was
the first class in which I was called upon. I have spent much of my
career at Harry's knee, by his side, and in his mind, reading what he
wrote, always with great admiration. There is one exception, however.
Harry at one time tried to settle the asbestos morass out of which arose
something called the Wellington Agreement, words I can hardly mention without shuddering after having a couple of encounters with this
document in the course of discharging my Article III duties. Otherwise, it is nothing but admiration.
My career would not have been what it was without him, although, as I said on another occasion, I did not get the judgeship because of his conspicuous association with the Reagan Administration.
Nevertheless, but for Harry, I very much doubt that I would ever
have become a second year law student at Yale Law School. I was not
the happiest camper there. And Harry was clearly someone who sustained what was my flagging interest in law. I did not leave, and that
evidently was the right decision. Harry has been great at discovering
people and launching their careers. There are many others here today, such as Alan Schwartz, who shared my happy experience.
So let me turn to the many sides of Harry Wellington. Harry Wellington, the young teacher, brought to the job not only passion but
intellectual iconoclasm and skepticism. He always stressed craft and
reasoned argument, both by students and the courts. In commenting
upon court decisions, he always stressed the need for courts in a democratic society to give reasoned explanations. Indeed, in reading an article he wrote with Alex Bickel, I was struck by the strength of the
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criticism they leveled at the Warren Court for failing to justify its decisions, although both of them favored the most publicly criticized decisions, Brown' in particular. Today it is difficult to find people with
intellectual rigor who will criticize a court's work based on its reasoning in decisions with which they agree.
As a teacher and writer, Harry also stressed institutional competence in law making. As much emphasis was placed on who ought to
decide the law as on what the actual decision ought to be. He dwelled
on the relative competence of state and federal courts and of agencies
and private ordering. Finally, although Rick 2 is correct about Harry's
recognition of the need for interdisciplinary study, one of the things
that really marked his work was his recognition of the legal process as
an independent discipline worthy of study on its own. He conceded
that other disciplines inform what we do, but they do not tell us how to
do. And that is very important.
Labor law at that time was a natural subject for this kind of
scholar, and he was able to bring all of these themes to his work in it.
He taught it as a complex and subtle mixture of various questions involving agency as against court, regulation as against private ordering,
federal as against state law, court as against arbitrator, and so forth. It
was really the perfect subject for him. It had a history ofjudicial intervention, a very controversial history. It had statutes. It bristled at the
time with undecided issues of regulatory law, federalism, administrative competence, and contracts. It was his good fortune to be teaching
contracts and labor law as the arbitration issues were working their way
through the courts.
It is important for those who are not long in the tooth to understand that labor law at the time was a work in progress. The average
labor law casebook every year would have a thick pocket supplement
and a new issue would come out in the spring only to have a pocket
supplement for the fall. Its ever-changing nature captured the students' interest because there were ongoing decisions going through
the courts. There were pre-emption cases, for example, with state and
federal law in the presence of the Labor Board, a regulatory agency
entitled to deference, although I will add that my experience over the
last nineteen years suggests an agency struggling at times to avoid deference. There were also the duty-to-bargain cases, a mixture of regula1.
2.
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tory law and private ordering. They involved a statute that commanded parties to bargain but also emphasized freedom of contract.
Those cases arose in a unique contractual setting because, in labor law,
you have bargaining parties unlike most contracting parties. Most contracting parties have a choice of dealing with other similar parties if
they do not like dealing with one party. Labor law involves parties who
find it extremely costly to separate in divorce.
Finally, you had the arbitration cases, again in a unique setting.
Labor law involves contracting parties in which the ongoing administration of the agreement is as important or more important than the
formation of the agreement. At the time these cases were working
their way through the courts, there was a common law background in
which many state courts said you could not sue labor unions because
they were not legal entities and other courts were denying specific
performance.
Now Harry, again, spoke on all of this with an iconoclasm and a
skepticism that is not often found in a field that can descend into "us
against them" depending on whether you favor employers or unions.
I must say in reflecting and reading, reflecting on those classes
and reading his work this week, I was struck by how old-fashioned
much of this is. There is today a tendency to downplay craft and reasoned argument in favor of result. Take the organized bar. You can
get a pamphlet from the ABA that will list the legal results it prefers on
what appear to be hundreds of issues without regard to whether the
desired results are consistent with each other, much less consistent
with any underlying rationale. You see bar associations giving awards
for cases that reached a particular result, again, without regard to
whether the judge or the court got there by legitimate or illegitimate
or logical or illogical reasons. Discussions of institutional competence
are less important to the modem lawyer and to the modem law student and to the modem law professor. They have not entirely disappeared, but one seems to find them more as make-weight arguments in
favor of one particular result or another than as serious intellectual
concerns.
But one of the things about Harry that I really want to stresssomething that also has changed over time, is his faith in the legal
process as something worthy of independent study. Now at the time of
which I am speaking, we all recognized the importance of other disciplines in law. One, of course, cannot study law and believe that it was
entirely uninfluenced by our knowledge about how people behave and
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act, about what is efficient, and so forth. But the issue is how and when
to adapt other disciplines to law. In legal writing today, there is certainly a shift in the center of gravity from discussing how other disciplines might inform law to believing that they dictate legal results. Yet
no regard is given to whether the legal process can actually put the
particular teachings to use or whether democratic rule can be made to
submit to the supposed dictates of whatever discipline from which the
particular commentator receives communion.
And I will say this about law and economics, a field in which I have
spent some time: the notion that courts are able to take anything but
the most crude form of economics into account and apply it usefully in
cases is quixotic. To be sure, today you see legal articles on the efficient market hypothesis that argue about how strong or weak it is but
never seem to get to the issue of how strong or weak it has to be to be
used to fashion legal rules. The same is true with regard to law and
philosophy. The notion that the puzzles of governing and moral philosophy can somehow be solved with some kind of finality by law
professors seems to me to be itself quixotic.
But let me now turn to the work Harry and I co-authored, if I
might, because, having read it again, I was struck by how relevant it is
today. This was a book entitled The Unions and the Cities.3 Writing it
with Harry was a marvelous experience for me and really gave me a
first hand look at his ability to pierce the conventional wisdom. The
Unions and the Cities was a very mildly stated critique of what was then
the conventional wisdom, namely, that the collective bargaining institutions, as established in the private sector, could be moved wholesale
to the public sector. Its concluding words were, "Make no mistake
about it, government is not just another industry."4 Now this was
mildly stated, but I understand that the reaction of some to it cost
Harry some arbitration work for a while.
The book had a very simple thesis. It assumed that collective bargaining, as established in the private sector, was the right policy. And
it asked whether it should be moved to the public sector. The fact that
it focused on the cities was significant because, although governmental
employees do not necessarily work for cities, big cities do have the
most constraints put upon them by public employee unions. They are
the most likely to be unionized. They are the most likely to have popu-
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lations of minorities and the poor, who are in many ways the employers
of public employee unions.
But I think we also focused on the cities because many of those
who were pressing most vigorously for transferring collective bargaining wholesale to the cities were also expressing concern over what was
perceived then, and is perceived now, as the urban crisis. I will state
the arguments of the book simply. In the private sector, there are few
products that are subject to what economists call highly inelastic demand. That means there are few products without substitutes that consumers can turn to without great cost, either because the substitute is
the identical product or one reasonably similar. This fact imposes constraints on what will result from collective bargaining in the private
sector because if consumers do not buy a product, employers and unions will not have a pie to divide. This was so with regard to not only
the monetary terms of collective agreements but also to the non-monetary terms asserted by employers at the time under the rubric "managerial prerogatives." The fact is that all of this goes to the bottom line,
the price of the product and service. And no union and no employer
could reach an agreement that created a price that would substantially
decrease sales.
In the public sector, matters are quite different. The elasticity of
demand for government services is very different. The elasticity of demand for police, fire, and education, for example, is quite low. Demand is very inelastic. And that is true particularly for the least well-todo of our citizens who do not have an easy substitute. They cannot
move to another area easily or purchase substitutes, such as private
guards. Moreover, in the private sector, employers have a bottom line.
In the public sector, municipal budgets are enormously complex, with
revenue coming from various sources. And, indeed, for various units
of employees, municipal elective officials may be able to pass the cost
off to other taxpayers. The officials will then offer little resistance to
union demands. The book also noted prophetically that elected officials would not have the same long-term vision as investors and private
employers. Mayors, for example, do not expect to be mayors after a
certain point, and may sign collective agreements that will have their
impact far off in the future. There is a line in the book noting that
New York City would some day pay the price for the Lindsay Administration's concessions on pensions, money that would have to be paid
by a later administration.
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Further, the book pointed out that non-monetary issues do not go
to the same kind of bottom line as they do in the private sector. In the
public sector, they go to the stuff of democracy. The ability to police
the police will be very different in a system in which elected officials
can freely discipline police than in a system in which discipline is subject to a review by an arbitrator. Seniority in the public sector has similar effects. In the public sector, you do not tell somebody to shape up
or get out very often because that cannot be done. For example, a
classroom teacher may be put in an administrative job because he or
she is no longer teaching well. If you try to cut down on the size of the
bureaucracy, however, you encounter a seniority clause that allows the
teacher to bump back into the classroom, with a good teacher being
laid off. This sort of phenomenon does have a lot to do with the delivery of government services.
Finally, the book noted that, in working democracies, we want any
sizable group to be able at some critical point to make its voice heard.
It pointed out that public employees generally are such a group and
that-particularly where you allow strikes that cause people to clamor
for settlements-adding collective bargaining wholesale to the existing
powers of public employees could be very dangerous to democratic
municipal rule. And today, you see public employees not only with the
protection of collective agreements but also with the protection of
state laws, such as tenure laws.
Now whatever your views on this, it was, I think, typical of Harry
that he did question conventional wisdom. And I think this sort of
attitude, with which I was so lucky to be associated over the years, was
of enormous inspiration to this law student anyway. And I am very
proud to be here and very happy to have been able to say these things
about you, Harry. Thank you.

